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THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST: WHY THE
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE SO MURKY
MICAH ADKISON*

Introduction
Be careful when you wade into murky water! In 1972, Congress granted
authority to regulate the waters of the United States to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Since then,
the courts have labored to define waters of the United States resulting in a
4-1-4 plurality opinion in the principal case of Rapanos v. United States.
The Rapanos Court identified two tests for defining waters of the United
States, one articulated by the plurality, and one by Justice Kennedy—the
significant nexus test. The significant nexus test, while broadly followed,
has failed to limit EPA overreach.
EPA jurisdiction warrants a bright-line rule due to concerns about
cooperative federalism, regulatory efficiency, resource allocation of the
EPA, and stewardship of private lands. Violations of the CWA can result in
substantial civil and criminal penalties. To avoid these consequences, small
businesses, particularly private landowners and farmers, require certainty
and regulatory clarity which cannot be obtained through nebulous terms of
art like “significant nexus.”
The simplest solution is often the best solution. Justice Scalia offered
such a simple solution in his plurality opinion in the principal case. His
simple bright-line rule is based on the specific characteristics of the water
* This author is a second year law student at the University of Oklahoma College of
Law and member of the Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal.
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(or wetland), such as its physical connection to traditionally covered waters
and its relative permanence. This clarity maximizes resource allocation to
protect the nation’s natural resources, maintains fidelity to the nation’s
system of federalism, and reinforces confidence in private land use and
development.
Congress delegated regulatory authority under the CWA to the EPA in
order to control the pollution of the waters of the United States. Since
passing the CWA, the meaning of the phrase “waters of the United States”
has been expanded and contracted through agency interpretation and
judicial review. Under the latest rule promulgated by the EPA (the
“WOTUS Rule”), the EPA purported to extend its reach under the CWA by
clarifying the phrase “waters of the United States.” Now, the courts are
again presented with the question of Congress’s intent in passing the CWA.
While the future of the WOTUS Rule remains uncertain, this article will
analyze the debate surrounding the EPA’s recent claim of jurisdiction and
advocate for a clear bright-line rule upon adjudication of a case currently
before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
I. Context and Summary of Litigation Before the Sixth Circuit
In 1972 Congress passed the CWA1 to control the pollution of the
nation’s waters.2 For over a century, the accepted meaning of the phrase
“waters of the United States,” as it pertained to federal legislation, was
interstate waters that were actually navigable.3 The Supreme Court, in a
more recent line of cases, has refined the meaning of this phrase to allow
meaningful regulation by the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps,”
“Corps of Engineers,” or collectively with the EPA, the “Agencies”), under
the CWA, while remaining mindful of the principles of federalism and
private property rights.4
The WOTUS Rule was promulgated on June 29, 2015.5 In it the EPA
claimed to “clarify” the definition of the phrase “waters of the United
1. 86 Stat. 884, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2015).
2. The “Clean Water Act” was originally billed as the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972. See W. Henry Graddy, IV, Let Us Hope for Smart Fish: A Clean
Water Act Practitioner’s Search for Ratchet Down, 10 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 161,
162 (1995).
3. See The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871).
4. See United States. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001);
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
5. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 FR 37054-01.
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States” under the CWA.6 The WOTUS Rule was scheduled to become
effective on August 28, 2015.7 However, on August 27, 2015, in an action
brought on behalf of thirteen states, a federal district judge in North Dakota
granted an injunction against the EPA finding, in part, that because the
WOTUS Rule purports to exert authority over bodies of water that bear no
significant nexus to navigable waters, the rule likely “violates the
congressional grant of authority to the EPA.”8
Threats by the federal government to impose the new rule on the thirtyseven states not party to the suit were met by strong opposition by many
state attorneys general.9 On September 4, 2015, the federal judge in North
Dakota declared that his ruling only applied to the parties to the original
action in North Dakota.10 Finally, on October 9, 2015, in an action brought
on behalf of Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Georgia, West Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, the North Carolina Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin (all thirty-one states
challenging the WOTUS Rule are collectively referred to as the “Opposing
States”), the Sixth Circuit granted a nationwide stay of enforcement of the
rule pending a judicial determination on the merits.11
II. Background of Federal Water Pollution Regulation
A. Traditional Meaning of Waters of the United States
One-hundred and one years before passing the CWA, the United States
Supreme Court defined navigable waters as those waters “which are
navigable in fact.”12 The Court elaborated that rivers are “navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”13
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. North Dakota v. U.S. EPA, No. 3:15-CV-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *5 (D.N.D.
Aug. 27, 2015).
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Scott Pruitt, AG Pruitt Comments on North Dakota Federal
Judge’s Ruling Blocking Implementation of WOTUS Rule (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with
author).
10. Order Limiting the Scope of Preliminary Injunction to the Plaintiffs, Civil No. 3:15cv-59 (Sep. 4, 2015).
11. In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015).
12. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871).
13. Id.
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[Waters] constitute navigable waters of the United States within
the meaning of the acts of Congress . . . when they form in their
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be
carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.14
The Mississippi River is an example of an interstate navigable water—a
traditional water of the United States. This interpretation of federal
regulatory jurisdiction remained relatively unchanged until the passage of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
which after further amendments in 1977 became the Clean Water Act.15
The CWA “restructured federal authority over water pollution control,
consolidating most regulatory authority over discharges to the nation’s
waters with the [EPA], but left the Corps with jurisdiction over dredge and
fill activity.”16
The CWA provides, “[e]xcept as in compliance with [various sections of
the CWA], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.”17 The CWA further provides for two permitting systems, the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),18 and Permits
for Dredged or Fill Material.19 Negligent violations of permit conditions or
limitations incur criminal penalties, for the first offense, of “not less than
$2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for
not more than 1 year, or by both.”20
The Administrator of the EPA (“Administrator”) may grant a NPDES
permit for “point source”21 discharges of pollution, or it may waive the
14. Id.
15. See Thomas L. Casey III, Testing Rapanos: United States v. Robinson and the
Future of “Navigable Waters”, 10 Engage: J. Federalist Soc’y Prac. Groups 39 (2009)
(providing an outstanding summary of the CWA).
16. Id.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
21. A point source is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged, [and specifically excludes] agricultural
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permitting requirement upon Administrator approval of a state administered
permitting system.22 The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of
the Corps of Engineers, may issue or deny permits for the discharge of
“dredged or fill material” into navigable waters.23
The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas.”24 In other words, everything that falls within
the EPA’s interpretation of the phrase “waters of the United States” is by
definition a navigable water insofar as it is covered by the CWA.
The Court has been left to determine Congress’s intent in using the
phrase “waters of the United States” when it delegated the authority to
enforce CWA to the EPA.25 By 1975, the phrase had been expanded beyond
the historical concept of “navigability,”26 and came to include “‘freshwater
wetlands’ adjacent to other covered waters.”27 What followed was a line of
cases meant to shape the jurisdictional reach of the EPA and Corps of
Engineers over waters, waterways, and wetlands lying within the borders of
the United States.
C. Agency Rulemaking and Judicial Deference
Analysis of agency propriety in promulgating new rules must begin with
a baseline understanding of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The

stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. § 1362; See
also Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1332 (2013)
(interpreting Congress’ mandate to the EPA to require NPDES permitting for “stormwater
discharges [into navigable waters] associated with industrial activity”).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(e).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Note the relevance of the defined term. Would a jurisdictional
bright-line be better drawn by defining waters of the United States as meaning navigable
waters, including the territorial seas? This legislative ambiguity lies at the heart of the debate
over the EPA’s jurisdictional reach. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (“Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers
under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed
‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”)
25. See United States. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001);
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
26. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.
1975) (“[A]s used in the [Clean] Water Act, the term [“navigable waters”] is not limited to
the traditional tests of navigability.”)
27. Casey, supra note 15, at 40 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31, 321 (1975)).
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APA requires notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.28
After publication of notice, “the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments.”29 This requirement is sometimes referred to as
the “notice-and-comment requirement” of the APA. When modifications
are made to the proposed rule, the agency only satisfies the notice of
proposed rulemaking requirements if the modifications to the final adopted
rule are a “logical outgrowth” of such notice.30 “A [modification to a] final
rule is a logical outgrowth if affected parties should have anticipated that
the relevant modification was possible.”31
In reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, a court
must determine whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue” or whether “the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue.”32 If Congress’s intent is clear and
unambiguous, such intent is given effect.33 Conversely, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous regarding the specific issue, the agency’s construction
is entitled to deference if such construction is not “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute” (judicial deference under this analysis is
“Chevron deference”).34
III. The Shaping of the Supreme Court’s EPA Water Regulation
Jurisprudence
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes35 centered on the Corps’
construction of the CWA to include “freshwater wetlands” within the
meaning of “waters of the United States.” The Corps defined freshwater
wetlands as:
those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
30. See Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Allina Health
Services v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
31. Allina Health Services, 746 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added).
32. Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 843-44; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706.
35. 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985).
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vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar
areas.36
Respondent, Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (“Riverside”), owned 80
acres of low-lying marshland near the shore of Lake St. Clair in Michigan.37
In 1976, to prepare for the construction of a housing development on the
property, Riverside placed fill materials on the property.38 The Corps of
Engineers sued in federal district court to enjoin Riverside from filling the
property without the Corps’ permission because the property was an
“adjacent wetland,” and thus within the Corps’ jurisdictional control.39
The district court granted the injunction and held that the portion of
Riverside’s property lying less than 575.5 feet above sea level was a
wetland covered by the CWA.40 On appeal, the case was remanded for
consideration of the effect of later amendments to the CWA added in
1977.41 On remand, the district court again granted the injunction to the
Corps because the property was a wetland within the Corps’ regulatory
jurisdiction.42 Riverside again appealed and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed because the semiaquatic characteristics of the Riverside
property “were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable
waters,” which likely fell outsides Congress’s intended grant of regulatory
authority to the Corps.43
After granting certiorari, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit.44 The Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that “frequent
flooding” by the adjacent navigable water is a “sine qua non of a wetland
under the regulation.”45 The Court noted the difficulty in determining the
“point at which water ends and land begins.”46 However, the district court’s
findings were not clearly erroneous because Riverside’s property was
“characterized by the presence of vegetation that requires saturated soil

36. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 125.
41. Id. The relevant changes in the amendments of 1975 and 1977 were minimal, but
the latter eliminated the use of the phrase “periodic inundation.” Id. at 124.
42. Id. at 125.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 126.
45. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 129.
46. Id. at 132.
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conditions for growth and reproduction[,] . . . the source of the saturated
soil conditions on the property was ground water[, and . . . the] property
was adjacent to a body of navigable water [in that the] saturated soil
conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of
respondent’s property to . . . a navigable waterway.”47
The Court noted that by defining “‘navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of
the United States’ [Congress intended to make] it clear that the term
‘navigable’ as used in the [CWA] is of limited import.”48 The purpose of
the Corps’ permitting authority was a “legislative attempt to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”49 Therefore, “Congress chose to define the waters covered by the
[CWA] broadly.”50 “Because [Riverside’s] property is part of a wetland that
actually abuts on a navigable waterway,” the Corps and the EPA’s
determination that such land is within its jurisdiction was reasonable.51
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of
Engineers
In 1986, the Corps attempted to exert jurisdiction over isolated waters,
not necessarily adjacent to navigable waters, which “are or would be used
as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties [or by] migratory
birds which cross state lines” (the “Migratory Bird Rule”).52 Fifteen years
later, the Corps’ expansive reach under the Migratory Bird Rule received
the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court.53
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) was a
consortium of Chicago suburban municipalities “united in an effort to
locate and develop a disposal site for baled nonhazardous solid waste.”54
SWANCC located a site for its project comprising a sand and gravel mining
site that was abandoned around 1960 and had “[given] way to a successful

47. Id. at 130-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 133.
49. Id. at 132 (quoting CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50. Id. at 133.
51. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (emphasis added).
52. 51 Fed.Reg. 41206-01 (1986). Of note, the regulation also purported to exert the
Corps’ jurisdiction over water “[u]sed to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.” Id.
53. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
54. Id. at 162-63.
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stage forest . . . [and] a scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of
varying size.”55
The Corps initially concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the
site, but reversed its decision upon notification by the Illinois Nature
Preserves Commission that migratory birds were observed at the site.56
SWANCC proposed several plans to mitigate damage and preserve the site
for the migratory birds and then received permits and approval from the
Cook County Board of Appeals, the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Illinois Department of Conservation, but the Corps
insistently refused to issue the Dredge or Fill permit under § 1344 of the
CWA.57
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals from summary
judgment in favor of the Corps, SWANCC argued that the Corps had
exceeded its authority in claiming jurisdiction over “nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory birds and in the
alternative, that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to
grant such regulatory jurisdiction.”58 The court of appeals ruled for the
Corps on both grounds.59
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed
the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.60 The Court noted that, in passing the CWA,
“Congress chose to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to [regulate] pollution . . . and use . . . of
land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the
exercise of his authority under this chapter.”61 The Court interpreted the
holding in Riverside to require a “significant nexus between the wetlands
and ‘navigable waters.’”62 The Court distinguished Riverside from
SWANCC by noting that the latter involves “wetlands that are not adjacent
to bodies of open waters.”63

55. Id. at 163.
56. Id. at 164.
57. Id. at 165.
58. Id. at 165-66.
59. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166.
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b)).
62. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). This was the genesis of what would later become an
important phrase in the Court’s CWA jurisprudence.
63. Id.
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The term “navigable waters” shaped the Court’s opinion as to “what
Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA.”64 The Court
held that expansion of the Corps’ authority “over ponds and mudflats
falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would result in a significant
impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and
water use.”65 Because such an expansive interpretation of the CWA would
have “alter[ed] the federal-state framework by permitting federal
encroachment upon traditional state power,” and it was not supported by “a
clear indication that Congress intended that result,” the Court refused to
defer to the Corps’ expansive interpretation of the CWA.66
C. Rapanos v. United States
The Court’s CWA jurisprudence culminated in the 2006 decision
Rapanos v. United States.67 Rapanos resulted in a plurality, 4-1-4, opinion,
which invalidated the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction, but established two
important tests for determining the meaning of the phrase “waters of the
United States.”68
Rapanos was a consolidated case.69 John Rapanos (“Rapanos”)
backfilled a wetland on his property, more particularly described as “land
with sometimes-saturated soil conditions . . . [lying] 11 to 20 miles [from
the nearest body of navigable water].”70 The Corps claimed that Rapanos’s
saturated fields fell within the definition of “waters of the United States,”
under the CWA.71 Because he backfilled his fields without a permit to do so
from the Corps of Engineers, Rapanos was subjected to “[t]welve years of
criminal and civil litigation.”72 The district court held that Corps had
properly claimed jurisdiction because the wetlands were adjacent to “waters
of the United States” and that petitioner was liable for violating the CWA.73
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed based on federal

64. Id. at 172.
65. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 172-73.
67. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
68. Id. at 716 (Syllabus by the Court).
69. Id. at 729. The actual case involved additional petitioners. For simplicity, this author
outlines the facts and circumstances of only one of the petitioners, John Rapanos. This
omission does not affect the subsequent legal analysis in any material way.
70. Id. at 719-20.
71. Id. at 720-21.
72. Id. at 721.
73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 715 (Syllabus by the Court).
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jurisdiction over sites with “hydrologic connections to the nearby ditches or
drains, or to remote navigable waters.”74
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s
“hydrologic connection” analysis, vacated the judgments below, and
remanded for further proceedings.75 Two rationales underlie the Court’s
invalidation of the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, one articulated by the
plurality, and the other given by Justice Kennedy in a separate concurrence.
1. “Rapanos Plurality Test”
Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia emphasized that the burden of
regulatory compliance with the Corps’ permitting requirements “is not
trivial.”76 The plurality complained about the pervasiveness of the Corps
and the EPA’s broad assertions of jurisdiction over the “waters of the
United States.”77 Scalia also emphasized that “the CWA [only] authorizes
federal jurisdiction . . . over ‘waters,’ [not over dry land].”78
The plurality defined a water of the United States as “[(1)] a relatively
permanent body of water [(2)] connected to traditional interstate navigable
waters.”79 The plurality further articulated the Corps’ jurisdiction over
wetlands to cover those wetlands that have “a continuous surface
connection with [a water of the United States], making it difficult to
determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”80
2. “Significant Nexus Test”
Writing only for himself, but joining in the holding, Justice Kennedy
devised an alternate approach by expounding upon the phrase “significant
nexus” mentioned by the SWANCC Court.81 Kennedy took issue with the
plurality’s requirement that a body of water must be relatively permanent
because, in his view, such a requirement would exclude “torrents [of water]
thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry channels,” citing the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 757.
76. Id. (plurality opinion) (“The average applicant for an individual permit spends 788
days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide
permit spends 313 days and $28,915.”)
77. See id. at 722 (“In the last three decades, the Corps and the [EPA] have interpreted
their jurisdiction . . . to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands . . . including half of
Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States”).
78. Id. at 731.
79. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167.
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Los Angeles River as an example of such a watercourse that might fall
outside the Agencies’ jurisdiction.82 The Agencies’ claim of jurisdiction
over such watercourses, according to Kennedy, would be entitled to
Chevron deference.83
Kennedy further contended that the plurality’s requirement of a
“continuous surface connection” was unsupported by the holding in
Riverside in part because “the connection might well exist only during
floods.”84 However, Kennedy noted, “mere hydrologic connection should
not suffice in all cases, . . . [a]bsent some measure of the significance of the
connection for downstream water quality [of traditionally navigable
waters].”85 Kennedy conceded that “the word ‘navigable’ in the [CWA]
must be given some effect” by stating, “[w]hen . . . wetlands’ effects on
water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone
fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’”86
Kennedy’s test for the Agencies’ jurisdiction under the CWA requires a
finding of a significant nexus between traditionally navigable waters and
the wetland at issue. Kennedy would require that “the wetlands, either alone
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”87
IV. Analysis of the Current Challenge Before the Sixth Circuit
A. Overview of the WOTUS Rule
The WOTUS Rule categorically asserts EPA jurisdiction over interstate
waters, territorial seas, impoundments of jurisdictional waters, covered
tributaries, and covered adjacent waters.88 The WOTUS Rule also makes
numerous categorical exclusions.89 Finally, the WOTUS Rule establishes
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 769-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 773-74.
Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
Id. at 779-80.
Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
33 C.F.R § 328.3.
The Final WOTUS Rule purports to exclude:
(1) Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.
(2) Prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an
area's status as prior converted cropland by any other Federal agency,
for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding
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that the significant nexus analysis will be applied on a case-specific basis
over prairie potholes, Carolina and Delmarva bays, pocosins, Western
Vernal pools in California, Texas coastal prairie wetlands, waters within the
100-year floodplain of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the
territorial seas (unless falling within a listed exclusion), waters within 4,000
feet of the high tide line or the ordinary high water mark of a traditional
Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.
(3) The following ditches:
i.
Ditches with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary
or excavated in a tributary.
ii.
Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated
tributary, excavated in a tributary, or drain wetlands.
iii.
Ditches that do not flow, either directly or through another
water, into [waters which are currently used, were used in the
past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide; interstate waters, including interstate
wetlands; or territorial seas].
(4) The following features:
i.
Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should
application of water to that area cease;
ii.
Artificial, constructed lakes and ponds created in dry land such
as farm and stock watering ponds, irrigation ponds, settling
basins, fields flooded for rice growing, log cleaning ponds, or
cooling ponds;
iii.
Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools created in dry
land;
iv.
Small ornamental waters created in dry land;
v.
Water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to
mining or construction activity, including pits excavated for
obtaining fill, sand, or gravel that fill with water;
vi.
Erosional features, including gullies, rills, and other ephemeral
features that do not meet the definition of tributary, nonwetland swales, and lawfully constructed grassed waterways;
and
vii.
Puddles.
(5) Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface
drainage systems.
(6) Stormwater control features constructed to convey, treat, or store
stormwater that are created in dry land.
(7) Wastewater recycling structures constructed in dry land; detention
and retention basins built for wastewater recycling; groundwater
recharge basins; percolation ponds built for wastewater recycling;
and water distributary structures built for wastewater recycling.
Id.
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navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas, impoundments, or
covered tributary (unless falling within a listed exclusion), and similarly
situated waters.90
In promulgating the new WOTUS Rule, the Agencies primarily rely
upon Justice Kennedy’s formulation of the significant nexus test.91 The
Agencies applied this “analytical framework” to a myriad of factual
circumstances.92 The Agencies seek to define certain terms and phrases left
undefined by Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test in Rapanos, such as:
(a) “similarly situated” waters,93 (b) “in the region,” and (c) the functions
to be determined in analyzing whether certain waters significantly affect the
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of covered waters.94
The Agencies defined the phrase “‘similarly situated’ in terms of
whether particular waters are providing common, or similar, functions for
downstream waters such that it is reasonable to consider their effect
together.”95 The Agencies defined “region [as] the watershed that drains to
the nearest [covered water].”96
In the significant nexus analysis, the Agencies claim that in identifying
the relevant functions—those functions that significantly affect the
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of covered waters—the Agencies
were “informed by the goals of the statute and the available science.”97 The
rule states:
Functions to be considered for the purposes of determining
significant nexus are sediment trapping; nutrient recycling;
pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering, and transport;
retention and attenuation of floodwaters; runoff storage;
90. Id.
91. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 3705401, 37061 (2015).
92. See id. (“[T]here is no indication in [Justice Kennedy’s] opinion that the analytical
framework his opinion provides for determining significant nexus for adjacent wetlands is
limited to adjacent wetlands.”)
93. The rule appears to use “wetlands” and “waters” interchangeably.
94. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 3705401, 37065 (2015).
95. Id. at 37066.
96. Id. at 37066-67. The United States Geological Society defines “watershed” as “the
area of land where all of the water that falls in it and drains off of it goes to a common
outlet.” In other words, all land is within a watershed! U.S. Geological Society, What Is A
Watershed?, http://www.water.usgs.gov/edu/watershed.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
97. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 3705401, 37067 (2015).
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contribution o+f flow; export of organic matter; export of food
resources; and provision of life-cycle dependent aquatic habitat
(such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding, spawning, and use
as a nursery area) for species located in traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas. The effect of an
upstream water can be significant even when . . . providing . . .
just one . . . of the functions listed.98
B. Legal Challenges to the WOTUS Rule
When the Sixth Circuit reaches the merits of the EPA’s jurisdictional
claim, the court will be challenged to facilitate a solution that restores and
maintains the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s
waters,99 while recognizing, preserving, and protecting the States’ primary
responsibility and rights to regulate pollution and use of land and water
resources.100
The Opposing States contend that the Agencies have failed to conform to
the rulemaking requirements of the APA.101 Some particularly troubling
aspects of the final WOTUS Rule are the distance limitations, e.g., “4,000
feet from the high tide or ordinary high water mark”102 of covered waters,
which, according to the Opposing States, were not included in the proposed
rule and thus, are not a “logical outgrowth of the rule proposed.”103 Because
the distance limitations are not specifically supported by scientific findings,
they are “not the product of reasoned decision-making [thereby making the
98. Id.
99. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.
100. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 166-67; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737; see also Exec.
Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (reinforcing the importance of
federalism in agency rulemaking).
101. In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Karen Bennett and John
Henson, Redefining “Waters of the United States”: Is EPA Undermining Cooperative
Federalism?, Engage Vol. 16, Issue 1 (The Federalist Soc’y), May 5, 2015 (“The comments
of governors, attorneys general, and various state agencies and departments are nestled
among over 1,055,000 mass mail comments, 11,800 generally non-substantive individual
comments, 4,500 anonymous comments, and comments from a broad spectrum of
businesses, industries, and environmental groups.”)
102. In addition to the Opposing States’ many criticisms of the WOTUS Rule, this
particular aspect of the rule is especially onerous. For instance, when the 4,000-foot buffer is
applied to the state of Oklahoma, the WOTUS Rule (and all of its legal trappings) covers
95% of the surface acres in the state. See American Farm Bureau Federation, How WOTUS
Will Affect Farmers: Completed Maps Showing WOTUS Jurisdiction (2015), available at
http://www.fb.org/issues/wotus/resources/.
103. In re EPA, 803 F.3d at 807.
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WOTUS Rule] vulnerable to attack as impermissibly ‘arbitrary or
capricious’ under the APA.”104
It is not clear whether the significant nexus test is required or whether
courts may apply the standard set forth by the Rapanos plurality. Following
the Rapanos decision, the federal circuit courts split in their application of
the results.105 Although the Agencies have relied primarily, if not
exclusively, upon Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, the Rapanos
plurality test merits consideration, particularly because of the confusion
created in determining the precise meaning of “significant nexus.” The
plurality’s requirement that a covered water be a “relatively permanent
body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters,” or a
wetland with “a continuous surface connection with [a water of the United
States], making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the
‘wetland’ begins”106 has emerged as the more workable test.
The Rapanos plurality test reduces the Agencies’ temptation to impose
arbitrary distance limitations on their claim of jurisdictional reach by
eliminating the need to do so. The test imposes a relatively simple, case-bycase, wetland analysis to determine, scientifically, whether a wetland shares
a “continuous surface connection” with a covered water. The most difficult
aspect of such wetland analysis is likely determining the point at which it
becomes “difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’
begins,” which seems to require subjectivity.
Admittedly, the Rapanos plurality test also requires certain exceptions to
be included under the definition of “waters of the United States,” such as
the Los Angeles River (a subject of Kennedy’s concern), but these
exceptions are few in number, limited primarily to the western arid states,
and easily supported by existing science. It is inappropriate, and perhaps
absurd, to use the unique characteristics of the Los Angeles River as the
basis for condoning harsh agency overreach nationwide.
The holding in Rapanos should be applied under the narrowest grounds
on which it was formulated.107 Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is a
104. Id.
105. Compare United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the
EPA could assert jurisdiction either by meeting the standard set forth by the Rapanos
plurality or by meeting Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus standard), with United States v.
Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (requiring a jurisdictional finding of
significant nexus).
106. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742.
107. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
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much more expansive interpretation of Congress’s grant of authority to the
Agencies than that of the plurality. The undefined nature of the significant
nexus test leads to overreach by the Agencies. Agency overreach leads to
an abuse of federal power and encroachment upon areas of sovereignty
traditionally reserved to the States. Because the Rapanos plurality test was
the narrowest grounds for invalidating the Corps’ jurisdiction over the
wetlands the Rapanos plurality test should be applied to Agency
jurisdiction in the case presently before the Sixth Circuit.
The Rapanos plurality test is the most prudent application of judicial
authority over the Agencies’ claim of jurisdiction under the CWA because
it clearly defines the Agencies’ jurisdictional reach, honors Congress’s
intent, and respects the States’ primary responsibility and rights to regulate
pollution and use of land and water resources.
The Rapanos plurality test provides a clear, bright-line rule, subject to
certain exceptions, which keeps faith with the spirit of cooperative state and
federal regulation of the nation’s waters. Justice Kennedy conceded that a
“mere hydrologic connection,” while necessary, might not be sufficient
without a showing of “some measure of significance of the connection”
resulting in “effects on water quality [that are not] speculative or
insubstantial.”108 The Rapanos plurality’s requirements of relative
permanence and continuous surface connection precisely provide such a
measure of significance. Beyond these reasonable boundaries, case-specific
exceptions or additional Congressional action should be required to avoid
ever more degradation of the nation’s system of federalism and separation
of power.
Conclusion
The WOTUS Rule should be invalidated, in its current formulation, by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Agencies violated the APA’s notice
and comment requirements when promulgating the final WOTUS Rule. The
final rule stretches the meaning of “waters of the United States” by using
arbitrary distances that are not supported by science, thereby
simultaneously exceeding Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test while
precluding its entitlement to Chevron deference. Finally, the WOTUS Rule
constitutes a substantial impingement on the States’ primary responsibility
and rights to regulate pollution and use of land and water resources. The
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”) (quoting another source) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
108. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780-84.
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court should look to the narrower rationale given by the Supreme Court, the
Rapanos plurality test, for a more workable solution. An issue as important
as cooperative state and federal regulation of the nation’s waters is worthy
of a bright-line rule that cannot be obtained through mere application of the
significant nexus test. Justice Scalia shows how the waters of the United
States can be crystal clear!109

109. Sadly, Justice Scalia passed away within twenty-four hours of this article being
selected for publication. It remains to be seen how his absence from the Court will affect the
WOTUS Rule.
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